Decision-makers can learn from their own past experience, and, potentially, from the experience of other decision-makers who face similar problems. When experience is private information, communication is necessary to learn from others. In a twoperiod model in which decision-makers care about their reputation, we study how the assignment of decision rights (who decides on the actions taken in period two?) and the information on which reputations are based determine (i) the willingness to share information, (ii) decisions, and (iii) welfare. Centralizing decision rights may hurt welfare due to the negative e¤ect on the quality of communication. The welfare e¤ects of reputation depend on whether perceptions of a decision-maker's ability are based solely on his own action or on comparisons across decision-makers, and on the assignment of decision rights.
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Introduction
Learning from one's own experience and learning from others are two important ways in which decision-makers can improve the decisions they take over time. It may help a physician in identifying a better intervention for a patient with a given diagnosis; it may help police in establishing a more e¤ective way of criminal investigative analysis; it can help organizational divisions in establishing what customer-relationship management system works best, etc.
The challenge in each case is to recognize the best course of action and to ensure its di¤usion.
In practice, the identi…cation and di¤usion of the best course of action raise two main problems. First, it has been established that once a decision-maker has chosen a course of action, he tends to cling to it, even if subsequently his own experience shows that another action would likely result in a better outcome.
2 One important reason for this behaviour has been put forward by, e.g., Kanodia et al. (1989) , and Prendergast and Stole (1996) : the presence of reputational concerns. Changing course of action amounts to an admission that the previous action was inappropriate. As a result, a change a¤ects perceptions of the ability of the decision-maker adversely. A decision-maker who wants to acquire a reputation for identifying the correct action, will be hesitant to change. The second problem is that learning from decision-makers located at other sites (hospitals, states, divisions etc.) is not automatic, but requires their willingness to share their private information. Reputational concerns may make communication strategic.
In this paper, we study how reputational concerns in ‡uence the quality of learning from others. We present a simple two-period model of learning. In period one, each agent at 1 Susan Bewley, consultant obstetrician, in Getting to the bottom of evidence based medicine, the British Medical Journal, April 5, 2008. 2 See, e.g., Thaler (1980) . his own site is confronted with a common problem, and receives a private signal. The informativeness of the signal is determined by the agent's ability at identifying the better course of action. Unaware that others are struggling with the same problem, each agent optimally follows his private signal, and next privately learns the true, common value of the chosen course of action. It may be that agents receive the same signal. The outcome of period one is a "historical pattern"of actions taken to address the common problem.
Next, decisions have to be made as to the action to adopt in period two. An agent may rely only on his own experience -the case studied in Prendergast and Stole. But if there is an awareness that other agents have addressed the same problem, it might be beni…cial to make use of their experience. This requires communication about locally gained experience.
Inspired by real world examples that we discuss below, our analysis focuses on two dimensions that may in ‡uence the quality of learning.
(i) Second period decision rights. Do local agents keep the authority to decide in period two (decentralized learning), or is it in the hands of some "center"that decides what actions are taken at the di¤erent sites (centralized learning)? In the …rst case, communication is horizontal, among the local agents. In the latter case, communication is vertical, from local agents to the center.
(ii) Information on which the perception of a local agent's ability is based. As in Prendergast and Stole, we assume that perceptions are based on observed actions only, not the values these actions generate, but we distinguish two cases. The perception of an agent's ability is either based on the actions taken at his site (locally determined reputations), or on the actions taken at all sites (globally determined reputations). In the latter case, comparisons across sites become possible, thanks to, e.g., increased transparency. As highly able agents are more likely to initially take the same action than less able ones, such comparisons may a¤ect perceptions.
We assume that the utility of a local agent is increasing in the value of the action taken at his site and his end-of-period reputation, and that the centre (e.g. a health care body, the head of the police force, corporate headquarters) only cares about the value of the actions taken. We compare various learning environments (as characterized by the two dimensions just mentioned) in terms of the ex ante expected value of the actions taken in period two ('welfare'). As there may be con ‡icts of interest between local agents, and between local agents and the center communication about the experiences gained is strategic. The only formal mechanism in place are the decision rights in period two. In particular, a decisionmaker cannot commit to make use of the information he will receive in a speci…c way. As a result, communication about the privately gained experience amounts to cheap talk.
The goal of this paper is to further our understanding of learning processes by establishing how (i) the assignment of decision rights and (ii) the information on which perceptions of abilities are based jointly determine the willingness of decision-makers to share private information, the quality of the decisions taken conditional on the information transmitted, and overall welfare.
As said, in practice the identi…cation and di¤usion of the best course of action can be a struggle. Consider the medical profession. The delivery of medical interventions varies widely from place to place. 3 This variation has been a source of worries as, most likely, some patients do not receive optimal treatment. 4 It also o¤ers scope for learning. In response, physicians' associations and health care authorities have exerted much e¤ort to design learning processes in which locally gained experiences are compared, and best practices -interventions, surgical procedures, drug use -di¤used. In the medical sector, expert panels are frequently used to evaluate the evidence on the e¤ectiveness of rival practices in a given …eld. Given the close ties between experts and industry, and the long gestation period that characterizes the development of practices, experts tend to have vested interests and to identify with certain practices. The result, according to students of expert panels, is "process loss" due to reputational concerns, leading in turn to poor information exchange and aggregation in the meetings, and a low adoption rate of best practices afterwards.
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Organizing these panels is therefore fraught with problems. An important organizational dimension is the degree of centralization of the process and, relatedly, the degree of freedom individual physicians have in following the outcomes of panel meetings. 6 It also seems that the IT revolution and increased information dissemination over the internet, in combination 3 That variation is large is a well-established fact, see Phelps (2000) . 4 See, e.g., Eddy (1990) . 5 See Fink et al. (1984) and Rowe et al. (1991) . 6 Eddy (1990) distinguishes, in increasing degree of freedom, standards, guidelines, and options.
with societal pressure to increase transparency makes it easier for patients and authorities to compare medical practices across places. This information can then shape the perception of physicians'abilities.
The European Union is another case in point. It has been promoting the so-called open method of coordination (OMC) to foster learning and the di¤usion of best practices in many policy areas. The hope is that goals like EU competitiveness can be furthered by avoiding the grand questions about the best model for Europe and by taking instead a more pragmatic micro-orientation in which countries that face similar problems seek to learn from each other.
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Rather than relying on legislation by Brussels-a form of centralized decision-making-, the OMC leaves decision rights with the EU countries: they decide whether to implement the lessons learned. Moreover, instead of applying formal sanctions to transgressors, the OMC turns to naming and shaming to expose a country's weak performance in public, and applies peer pressure if a country opposes adoption of superior policies. 8 In practice, the method is not considered to be very successful in guaranteeing a high quality learning process. It is generally felt that countries exaggerate the success of their current practices. Also, the implementation of new ideas is very limited. Claudio Radaelli (2003, p. 12) argues that these disappointing results stem from a misguided view of policy makers among the proponents of the OMC. Rather than caring about the truth, they care about 'political capital' and 'prestige'-forms of reputational concerns. Arguably, the 'naming and shaming in public'
suggests that the perception of an agent's ability in the case of the OMC can be based on comparisons across countries.
We obtain the following results. Our model replicates one of the …nding of Prendergast and Stole: if an agent cannot communicate with another agent but has to decide what course of action to take in complete isolation and on the basis of his own experience only, then reputational concerns make him conservative. 9 This conservatism implies a loss of welfare that is growing in the degree to which the agent cares about his perceived ability.
7 Policy areas where the OMC has been applied in areas as diverse as employment, social inclusion, innovation, education, occupational health and safety. 8 See Pochet (2005) and Radaelli (2003) . 9 As ours is a binary-choice model, we cannot replicate the second main …nding of Prendergast and Stole, namely that early on a decision-maker reacts too strongly to information to boost his reputation.
If learning from others is possible and happens in a decentralized way, an agent remains conservative to protect his reputation. The information on which he can base his second period decision is partly gained from own experience and from what others are willing to share with him. The quality of information exchange is high if reputations are locally determined.
He can only gain by listening to others, and has nothing to loose by truthfully revealing his own experience, as his reputation does not depend on the action that others adopt in period two. If instead reputations are determined globally, his reputation is particularly strong if others start to adopt "his" initial course of action. As a result, communication becomes strategic: it becomes important for an agent to convince others that "his" technology is best. We show that communication breaks down completely. Interestingly, the fact that an agent has less information on which to base his second period decision does not by itself mean that welfare goes down. This is also determined by the reputational gain of distorting the decision. Essentially, if there is more information on which the agent bases his decision, there is also more information about his ability that can be gleaned from that decision. We derive an intuitive condition that speci…es when the additional information shared among agents next leads to an increase or decrease in welfare.
Second period decision-making in case of a centralized process does not su¤er from conservatism as, by assumption, the center only cares about welfare. But the center depends on the agents to provide him with information. An agent now faces a trade-o¤. On the one hand, as the agent has no decision-making power, he wants to make sure that the center is well-informed. On the other hand, his reputational concerns imply that he wants the center to impose "his" technology at either site. In equilibrium, each agent sends coarse information about his own practice. This has a number of consequences. First, replacing a decentralized process by a centralized one reduces the quality of information exchange if reputations are locally determined. We derive the conditions under which the quality of information exchange in case of a centralized process becomes so poor that it o¤sets the improved decision-making conditional on information. Second, if reputations are globally determined, replacing a decentralized process by a centralized one improves communication.
In fact, a centralized process creates more welfare than a decentralized one in case reputations are based on comparisons across sites. We show that communication between the agents and the center never vanishes, for any …nite weight the agents put on their reputations. Finally, we derive conditions under which, in case of centralized process, welfare goes up if locally based reputations give way to globally based reputations.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the related literature. In Section 3, we present the model. Section 4 analyses isolated agents, a benchmark situation in which agents can learn from their own past experience only. In section 5 we analyse decentralized learning, with local and global markets. In section 6 we perform the same analysis for centralized learning. Section 7 contains the comparisons. Section 8 concludes.
Related Literature
Our paper is related to a number of literatures.
(1) Information processing when information is dispersed. Our paper is closest related to Alonso, Dessein, and Matouschek (2008) and to Rantakari (2008) . They study the desirability of a centralized or decentralized process in the context of a multidivisional …rm. Each division bene…ts from adapting its decision to its own market circumstances and from coordinating its decision with those of the other divisions. Divisions are privately informed about their market circumstances. They can either exchange information and next decide independently of each other what decisions to take or they can report information to headquarters which then decides for both divisions. They show that even if coordination becomes of overriding concern to the …rm, a decentralized process may still outperform a centralized process due to the di¤erence in quality of communication. 10 As Alonso et al.
and Rantakari we study the e¤ect of the assignment of decision rights on the quality of communication and of the …nal decisions taken. The situation we analyse, however, is quite di¤erent. In our paper, there are no local circumstances to which a decision should ideally be adapted, nor is there a need to coordinate per se. Instead, there is room for learning from each other's past experience (to identify the better course of action), resistance to change 10 Friebel and Raith (2010) study how the scope of the …rm a¤ects the quality of strategic information transmission between a division and head quarters.
(because of reputational concerns), and possibly the desire to convince other agents to adopt one's initial course of action (again, due to reputational concerns).
The importance of dispersed information has already been highlighted in debates on the relative merits of a planning economy and a market economy in the 1930s, see e.g. Hayek (1945) . Team theory, as developed by Marshak and Radner (1972) , is one of the …rst formal attempts to address the question how an organization should be structured to deal optimally with dispersed information. In this theory, interests of organizational members are perfectly aligned, and so incentive problems do not arise. Instead, the focus is on exogenously speci…ed communication and information-processing constraints. In our paper, we focus on the e¤ect of agents'interests on their willingness to share information. We share with the mechanism design literature a focus on the incentive problems surrounding communication. However, we do not assume that agents can commit to mechanisms. Only decision rights can be assigned.
As a result, an important implication of the Revelation Principle, that a centralized process is always at least as good as a decentralized one, does not hold.
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There are other papers in economics and political science that explore how characteristics of decision-making processes in ‡uence the quality of cheap talk communication. 12 . The current paper di¤ers from the existing literature in its focus on the possibilities for learning from one's own experience and from the experience of others in a context where agents have reputational concerns.
(2) Reputational concerns. The e¤ect of reputational or career concerns has been studied in various environments. Holmstrom (1999) studies the incentives such concerns give to exert productive e¤ort if there is uncertainty about an agent's ability level. If there is uncertainty about an agent's ability to 'read' or predict the state of the world one speaks of 'expert' models. Experts use the recommendations that they give, the implementation decision that 11 See Mookherjee (2006) and Poitevin (2000) for excellent surveys of the assumptions underlying the Revelation Principle. They also discuss various modelling strategies that can be used to explain why decentralization and delegation outperform centralization. 12 In economicss see e.g. Dessein (2002 Dessein ( , 2007 , Visser and Swank (2007) , Alonso et al. (2008 ), Rantakari (2008 , and Friebel and Raith (2010) . In political science, see e.g., Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987) , AustenSmith (1990) , Coughlan (2000) , and Austen- Smith and Feddersen (2005). they take, or the e¤ort they exert to convince the market of their expertise. 13 Part of this expert literature looks at the e¤ects of information disclosure ('transparency') about an expert's actions and about the outcomes of decisions. 14 The present paper is related to that literature, as the information on which an agent's reputation is based can change, either by design or by some external force, from speci…c to his site to involving comparisons across sites. We show that as a result of the additional information, communication is destroyed in case of a decentralized process, but improves in case of a centralized process. That is, the same form of transparency may give rise to very di¤erent e¤ects depending on the institutions in which it is introduced.
(3) Laboratory federalism and policy di¤usion.
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In an interesting recent paper, Volden, Ting, and Carpenter (2008) study what happens if policy makers trade o¤ policy e¤ectiveness at solving problems and political preferences. They compare the adoption patterns of states that act independently and learn from their own past performance at addressing common problems with the patterns that arise if states learn from each other. Our focus is di¤erent from theirs as we study the quality of information exchange among decisionmakers, compare centralized and decentralized decision-making, and study the e¤ect of the informational basis of reputations.
(4) Learning. We already mentioned the seminal paper by Prendergast and Stole (2006) on learning from one's own observations by an agent who also cares about his perceived ability.
Compared to their paper, we introduce learning from others, and hence communication, a discussion of decision rights, and di¤erent information sets on which perceptions of ability can be based. Our paper is also related to some existing literature on learning from others. This literature is, however, methodologically quite di¤erent from ours. In the existing literature, it is assumed that either an agent observes the true value of the actions taken by others,
13 Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and Sorensen (2001, 2006) deal with the advice given by experts. Milbourn et al (2001) and Suurmond et al. (2004) , deal with the projects an expert implements and the e¤ort he exerts to become informed. 14 See Suurmond et al. (2004) and Prat (2005) The fact that in our model the quality of information exchange and the degree of inertia are endogenous, and that a key assumption of the statistical bandit model is violated imply that a general analysis of the asymptotic behaviour of the decision-making processes described here is di¢ cult and beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we compare the 16 See the discussion of social learning in a strategic experimentation game in Bergemann and Välimäki (2006) . In this literature, it is assumed that an agent perfectly observes both the technology others use and the true value they obtain. It is not clear that an agent, if he could, would not want to deviate from a strategy of truthfully revealing the value of the technology he has gained experience with. It seems that he would bene…t from exaggerating the value as this would make adoption by others more likely. As a result, more (public) information would become available about this technology, and the deviator would bene…t from an improved estimate of the technology's value. 17 See Bala and Goyal (1998) for a model of learning in non-strategic networks, and Ellison and Fudenberg (1993, 1995) and Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004) behaviour of agents across various decision-making processes in a two-period setting.
(5) Cheap talk. In their seminal paper, Crawford and Sobel (1982) show that cheap talk between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver (decision-maker) can be informative,
and that the quality of information exchange depends on the degree of alignment between the interests of both parties. In Crawford and Sobel, and in the literature on cheap talk in general, the degree of alignment is exogenously given. In our model, by contrast, it is determined in equilibrium. The reason is that senders are concerned with their reputations.
These reputations are determined in equilibrium. A consequence is that, as we show below, in case of a centralized process and reputations based on comparisons across sites, cheap talk remains informative for any …nite weight that agents put on their reputation.
3 A model of learning from own experience and learning from others with reputational concerns.
There are two sites (hospitals, states, etc.), i 2 f1; 2g, and one problem. There is an agent i at each site. Often, j will denote "the other site"or "the other agent,"j 6 = i. The problem has to be addressed at each site both in period t = 1 and in t = 2. There are two possible technologies (policies, interventions, etc.) X 2 fY; Zg, one of which has to be used to address the problem at each site in each period. The technology adopted at site i in period t is denoted by X i;t . A priori, the value of technology X is unknown, but independent of time and site. It is a random draw from a continuous and strictly increasing distribution function F X ( ) and associated density function f X ( ), with support [0; 1]. Note that we use X both to denote a technology and its random value. We assume that the values of technologies Y and Z are iid, F Y = F Z = F . We use lower case letters, like x, to denote a possible value (realization) of the value of technology X, such that x 2 [0; 1]. As strategies will be de…ned in terms of X (or x), it will be useful to let X C (or x C ) refer to "the other technology".
The agents'ability levels i 2 ; and the state of the world (y; z) 2 [0; 1] 2 are exogenously given. The ability levels and the state of the world are all statistically independent, with = Pr i = 2 (0; 1) for i 2 f1; 2g.
At the beginning of period t = 1, agent i at site i receives a private, non-veri…able,
about which technology solves the problem best. The informativeness of the signal depends on the agent's ability:
That is, if i is highly able, i = , the signal reveals with probability one the better technology: Pr x > x C js X ; = 1 for X 2 fY; Zg. Hence, conditional on s X and = , X is distributed as the maximum of two iid random variables, F X xjs X ; = F (x) 2 . On the other hand, if i is less able, i = , the signal is uninformative about the relative quality of the technology:
Note that an agent does not get a signal about his ability. Instead, is the common prior.
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Still in period 1, i next decides which technology X to adopt on the basis of his signal s i .
At the end of the period he learns the value x of the chosen technology.
At this point, it is worth emphasizing that the focus of our analysis will be on period 2. As mentioned in the introduction, we intend to understand the pros and cons of alternative learning processes in situations where (i) agents have gained experiences with di¤erent technologies, treatments, or policies and (ii) there is scope for learning from others. In our model, period 1 can be interpreted as the history in which agents gained information. We model history to stress that past decisions matter for current decisions, for example, through reputational concerns.
We distinguish three learning processes p that characterize period t = 2. Such a process consists of a decision-making stage, possibly preceded by a communication stage. In case there is a communication stage, agent i sends a message about the quality of the technology adopted at site i in period t = 1. The receiver of this message depends on the process p. We assume that agent i, if and when he sends a message, knows the technology (not its value) that j has used in t = 1 when he sends a message. This is often the relevant case, as agents may well be aware that other technologies are used, without knowing their quality. Hence, a communication strategy p i ( ) is a conditional probability distribution. Let p i (m i js i ; x i;1 ; X j;1 ) be the likelihood that i sends a cheap talk message m i 2 M , where M = [0; 1] is a message space, in case his signal equals s i , the observed value of X i;1 equals x i;1 , and agent j uses technology X j;1 . Next, a decision maker determines which technology X i;2 is adopted at site i at time t = 2. Who this decision maker is depends on the decision process p. Let I (ii) In case of decentralized learning (p=dl), each agent i simultaneously sends a message m i to the other agent concerning the value of the technology he has adopted in t = 1. So, has been adopted at each site, and a message concerning the value of each technology. Next, the center decides which technology is adopted at either site. Let d cl C (X 1;1 ; X 2;1 ; m 1 ; m 2 ) 2 fY; Zg fY; Zg denote the correspondence indicating for given technologies used at either site and for given messages sent by the agents the technology that is used at sites 1 and 2, respectively in t = 2. As no confusion can arise, we write I C instead of I cl C , and
An agent's utility depends on the value of the technology adopted at his site and on his perceived ability or reputation. This perception is based on the information set i;t .
We will say that "the market" infers an agent's reputation from i;t . This market could be, e.g., the (internal) labour market or the electoral market. As in Prendergast and Stole (1996) , we assume that perceptions are based on actions (technologies) chosen, not on the value generated. We distinguish two cases. Say that reputations are locally determined if the reputation of agent i is based on the technologies used at site i only, i;1 = fX i;1 g and i;2 = fX i;1 ; X i;2 g for i 2 f1; 2g. Instead, say that reputations are globally determined if the reputation of agent i is based on the technologies used at both sites i and j, i;1 = fX i;1 ; X j;1 g and i;2 = fX i;1 ; X j;1 ; X i;2 ; X j;2 g for i 2 f1; 2g. We call (X i;1 ; X j;1 ; X i;2 ; X j;2 ) the adoption vector, indicating which technologies are adopted in t = 1 at sites i and j, and in t = 2 at sites i and j, respectively. If x is the value of the technology X i;t that i adopts, then the period t utility of agent i equals U (X i;t ) = x + ^ i;t ( i;t ), where^ i;t ( i;t ) = Pr i = j i;t equals the belief that i is highly able conditional on i;t , and > 0 is the relative weight of reputational concerns. We ignore time discounting. The center's utility equals the sum of the values of the technologies adopted in t = 2.
Di¤erent decision processes cause di¤erences in behaviour in the second period, but not in the …rst. This will be readily apparent from the analysis in the following sections. This lemma is illustrated in Figure 1 , panel a. The horizontal line represents the unconditional expectation E [Z], and the conditional expectation E Zjs Y ; y is a convex function of y.
Ignore reputational concerns for the moment. Given I ia 1 = s Y ; y , the decision strategy that maximizes the expected value of the technology adopted at site 1 in the second period, the …rst-best strategy, is to stick to the existing technology if and only if y E Zjs Y ; y .
It follows from lemma 1, part (b), and it is clear from Figure 1 , panel a, that the …rst-best decision strategy is a single-threshold strategy,
with t = y 
Besides being interested in picking the most valuable technology, an agent is also interested in his reputation. Consider a threshold decision strategy and any threshold value t 2 (0; 1). In case of isolated agents, markets only have local knowledge. Let^ (Y; X 1;2 ; t)
denote the reputation, obtained using Bayes'rule, if X 1;2 2 fY; Zg, and the agent uses the threshold t. Then,
Irrespective of t, continuation commands a higher reputation than switching to the other technology. Continuation suggests having observed a su¢ ciently high value of y. A highly able agent is more likely to have implemented a technology that generates a high value than a less able agent. Hence, as an agent cares about his reputation, he wants to deviate from the …rst-best decision rule by lowering the hurdle that his initial technology should pass for its continuation. The agent wants to give up technological adequacy for reputational bene…ts.
We will call the di¤erence^ 1 (Y; Y ; t) ^ 1 (Y; Z; t) the reputational gap. It is the source of the distortion. Proposition 1 describes equilibrium behaviour of an isolated agent.
Proposition 1 In case of isolated agents, and for < ia = E [Z] = , there exists an equilibrium in which the decision strategy is a single-threshold strategy with threshold value y ia 21 Deriviations can be found in the proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix.
that satis…es
with y ia 2 0; y
. y ia is a decreasing function of . 22 For ia , y ia = 0, i.e., agent 1 always continues his initial technology, and^ 1 (Y; Y ; 0) = and^ 1 (Y; Z; 0) = 0.
Eq (3) is illustrated in Figure 1 , panel b. At the threshold value y ia the agent is indifferent between sticking to Y and switching to Z. This can also be seen by rewriting (3) as y ia + ^ 1 (Y; Y ; y ia ) = E Zjs Y ; y ia + ^ 1 (Y; Z; y ia ). The left-hand side equals the value of continuing with Y if its observed value equals y ia , whereas the left-hand side equals the value of switching technology for the same observed value of Y . It follows from (2) that the lower y ia is, the lower is the reputation the agent commands in case of sticking to the original technology and in case of switching technologies. If the hurdle for continuation is lowered, passing the hurdle becomes a less convincing signal of ability. At the same time, not passing a lower hurdle becomes a stronger signal of incompetence. It can be checked that the reputational gap increases the lower is y ia . As the reputational gap is still strictly positive for a threshold value equal to zero, it follows from (3) that for ia y ia = 0: the agent will continue with his initial choice of technology irrespective of its observed value. 
Decentralized learning
In this section, we assume that the right to decide about the technology to be adopted in period two remains with the agents. We begin by describing …rst-best behaviour in a decentralized process. In the communication stage each agent truthfully reveals his private information. Say that 1 truthfully reveals his private information if, for all y 2 [0; 1], and all X 2;1 2 fY; Zg, Pr m 1 js Y ; y; X 2;1 = 1 if m 1 = y and Pr m 1 js Y ; y; X 2;1 = 0 otherwise.
Next, the …rst-best decision strategy equals 
Locally determined reputations
Can truthful revelation be part of an equilibrium? With agent 1's reputation independent of what the other agent decides, and with agent 1 being free to choose what technology to adopt in t = 2, truthful revelation of the technology's value is an equilibrium communication strategy for each agent 24 . Absent any motive to in ‡uence the other agent, the quality of the information exchange is high.
Once communication has taken place, each agent independently decides whether to continue with his original technology or to switch to the other technology. Let a double-threshold
That is, agent 1 continues with his original technology Y (i) if both agents used the same technology and its value exceeds t S ; or (ii) if the agents used di¤erent technologies, but the 23 Of course, the fact that both experts used the same technology in the …rst period bodes well for the superiority of this technology: y
ia . 24 In fact, it is payo¤ irrelevant, both directly (cheap talk) and indirectly, as 2's actions do not a¤ect 1's payo¤.
other technology is either less valuable or its superior performance does not exceed by a margin larger than t D the value of the current technology. Let^ 1 (Y; X; t S ; t D ) denote 1's reputation if he uses the double-threshold strategy, and adopts X 1;2 = X 2 fY; Zg in period 2.
To see that an agent wants to distort the decision on X 1;2 , suppose 1 were to use the …rst-best threshold values, ( t S ; t D ) = y F B dl ; 0 . If 1 continues with his initial technology, the market deduces that either the same technology was used at the other site and its observed value exceeded y F B dl , or that the other site used the other technology which proved to be of inferior quality. Either event strengthens 1's reputation. Analogously, discontinuing a technology hurts a reputation. As a result, reputational concerns induce an agent to distort the decision in t = 2. If both agents adopted Y in t = 1, then agent 1 sticks to this technology if and only if
Similarly, in case agents adopted di¤erent technologies, agent 1 wants to continue with Y i¤
. Proposition 2 describes equilibrium behaviour.
Note that lo stands for locally determined reputations. (ii) the belief functions are Pr (x 2;1 jm 2 ) = 1 for x 2;1 = m 2 and Pr (x 2;1 jm 2 ) = 0 for x 2;1 6 = m 2 ; (iii) the decision strategy is a double-threshold strategy. For < lo dl , threshold values ( t S ; t D ) satisfy
with t S 2 0; y ȳ y 
Globally determined reputations
We start by showing that …rst-best behaviour, described on page 17, is not equilibrium behaviour. Suppose imputed equilibrium behaviour is …rst-best behaviour. Then, if agents initially adopted di¤erent technologies, the only adoption vectors possible are (Y; Z; Y; Y ) and (Y; Z; Z; Z). The inference the market draws from the …rst (resp. second) vector is that Y (resp. Z) is the superior technology, and that 1 made the correct (resp. wrong) choice. The correct choice can be thanks to skill, or due to low ability and luck. The wrong choice, by contrast, must be due to low ability. given any adoption vector, any increase in the use at t = 2 of the technology 1 adopted in t = 1 does not decreases the reputation of 1.
Assumption 1 Consider any adoption vector with X 1;1 = Y . The reputation of 1 does not decrease if 1 (resp. 2) changes from X 1;2 = Z to X 1;2 = Y (resp. from X 2;2 = Z to
With this assumption, the deviation is advantageous in terms of reputation, and costless in terms of technical adequacy. We have proved the next Lemma.
Lemma 2 First-best behaviour is not equilibrium behaviour in case of decentralized learning with globally determined reputations.
25 See the proof of Proposition 3.
The above line of reasoning can be applied to any imputed equilibrium in which, in case agents started by adopting di¤erent technologies, 2's decision regarding X 2;2 depends on the message m 1 of 1. The pro…table deviation is then for 1 to send the message that induces 2 to adopt Y , and to continue to base his own decision for t = 2 on a comparison of y and the expected value of Z given m 2 . This shows that the unique equilibrium communication strategy in case X 2;1 = Z is a pooling strategy. 26 The interest an agent has to convince the other to agent to switch technology destroys all meaningful communication. This is in line with one of the concerns expressed about the OMC in the EU, a case of a decentralized learning process with globally determined reputations.
In case agents initially adopted the same technology, Y , it is easy to see that truthful revelation is an equilibrium strategy. Communication is also irrelevant. 27 Proposition 3 below establishes that in this case an agent wants to deviate from …rst-best behaviour in the decision stage. 29 26 To avoid a discussion of out-of-equilibrium beliefs, we assume that each agent uses a probability distribution over the full support [0; 1] that is independent of the value x he observed. We refer to this equilibrium communication strategy simply by "pooling strategy". 27 This is so as in our model technologies have a common value that is learned before agents communicate in t = 2. (ii) the belief function equals (a) the density f 1 zjI dl 1 = f (z) for all z and m 2 in case X 2;1 = Z; and (b) discrete probabilities in case X 2;1 = Y , Pr (yjm 2 ) = 1 for y = m 2 and Pr (yjm 2 ) = 0 for y 6 = m 2 ;
(iii) the decision strategy is a double-cut-o¤ strategy. The cut-o¤ value in case initial technologies are the same, c S , satis…es
with c S 2 0; y 
with c D 2 0; y ȳ y
In case reputations are globally determined, there are two reputational gaps. In panel c, (4) and (5) in Proposition 2.
Centralized learning
Now we turn to the case where the local agents who gained experience in period one do not have the right to decide on the technology to be adopted in period two; instead, the "centre"
decides. First-best behaviour in the case of a centralized learning process is for each agent to truthfully reveal his private information, and for the center next to pick the technology with the higher, reported or expected, value: We start by showing that …rst-best behaviour is not equilibrium behaviour in case of centralized learning.
Lemma 3 Under centralized learning, an equilibrium in which agents truthfully reveal their private information does not exist, neither in case of locally nor in case of globally determined reputations.
It su¢ ces to show that agent 1 has an incentive to slightly exaggerate the value of Y in case j adopted a di¤erent solution. If agents and planner were to stick to …rst-best behaviour, then an agent commands a higher reputation if he is allowed to continue with "his"solution ; m 2 ) = Z with probability smaller than one. That is, the agent uses at least two ranks, N 2. To save space, we write a instead of a (N ) if this does not lead to confusion.
Does an agent truthfully report the value of his technology to the center if the other agent uses the same technology in t = 1? Agent i's interest are di¤erent from those of the center, but identical to those of the agent j. This o¤ers room for the agents to (tacitly) collude, and to induce the center to choose the technology they deem best. Each can send either of two messages, one such that the center will next decide that the technology is su¢ ciently good to merit continuation, and one inducing the center to force the agents to switch. Note that collusive behaviour of this sort seems easy to sustain as there is no asymmetric information among the agents.
32 Although this is a partition strategy with N 2, to distinguish it from the more general partition strategy in case agents use di¤erent technologies, we refer to it as a collusion strategy. It is completely characterized by a single value, y S 2 [0; 1], for which an agent is indi¤erent between sending one message rather than the other.
Let the center choose the technology that is the better one given the messages of the agents. In case they rank di¤erent technologies the same, the center is indi¤erent and tosses a coin. Even if both agents report on the same technology, the center may still decide to 31 Note that between any two partitions the expert uses a random strategy. This guarantees that in equilibrium any possible message is sent with strictly positive probability. A discussion of out-of-equilibrium beliefs (what should the planner think about the value of a technology if he were to observe a non-equilibrium message?) can thus be avoided. 32 In a previous version of this paper we show that truthfully revealing information to the center in case agents use the same technology can be part of equilibrium. However, it amounts to playing a weakly dominated strategy, an unlikely candidate to describe agents'behaviour.
make them switch to the other technology. Formally, 
and g (x) = 0 everywhere else. The next proposition characterizes equilibrium behaviour.
Proposition 4 De…ne
. In case of centralized learning, there exists an equilibrium in which (i) the center's decision strategy is as de…ned in (8).
(ii) the communication strategy is (a) a partition strategy (N ; a ) if initial technologies di¤er, and (b) a collusion strategy y S if initial technologies are the same;
(ii) the center's belief function is (a) f 1 (x i;1 jI C ) = T r x i;1 ; a r ; a r+1 for m 
33 Note that we assume that the planner tosses a coin in case of X 2;1 = Z and E Y jI In case agents used di¤erent technologies, the communication strategy is a partition strategy. Eqs (9) and (11) determine the partitioning in case of local and global markets, respectively. If agent 1 observes a value y he has to decide how to rank his technology. The higher the rank is, the more likely it becomes that the center chooses his technology. This suggests that his technology is the better one. As a result, agent 1 enjoys a reputational bene…t. Ranking it highly also has a cost. If z > y but agent 2 does not rank Z as highly as 1 ranks Y , the center forces both agents to choose Y , the inferior technology in period 2.
This possibility stops the agent from ranking his technology too highly. The left-hand sides of the equations state the net reputational value of continuing with one's technology. For y = a r , this gain is exactly o¤set by a loss in expected project value due to continuation: the agent is indi¤erent between using two adjacent ranks (messages) to describe the value of technology Y . Sending one message rather than the other changes the choice of the center only for z 2 a r 1 ; a r+1 , see the right-hand side of (9) and (11).
In terms of informativeness, a partition strategy is in between the truthful revelation that This di¤erence is illustrated in Figure 4 . Panel a shows the determination of the equilibrium value a 1 in the uniform-quadratic case of Crawford and Sobel. For N = 2, the value of
2b, see e.g. Gibbons (1992, p. 216) . This equality can also be written as
The LHS captures the di¤erence in preference alignment. It determines the equilibrium value a 1 . The LHS (RHS) of (13) 
Panel b shows the determination of the equilibrium value a 1 in case communication between the agents and center is limited to at most two ranks and reputations are determined globally. With at most two ranks, (11) reduces to
The dotted lines represent the LHS for various values of . The reputational gap, the source of the di¤erence in preference alignment, depends on the equilibrium value a 1 and equals zero for a 1 = 0. The drawn line graphs the RHS. The graphs illustrates that for any …nite , there is a unique a 1 > 0. That is, for any …nite weight that the agent puts on his reputation, the agent uses (at least) two ranks.
The key to understand why communication among agents and centre remains possible for any …nite is the fact that the reputational gap equals zero for a 1 = 0. If agents use di¤erent technologies and a 1 = 0, the center decides on the technology that is to be used in t = 2 by tossing a coin. With globally determined reputations, it is known that the initial distribution of technologies equaled Y; Z. . 35 The reason is that it is not known whether agents initially used the same technologies or di¤erent ones. If an agent is forced to change technology, it is inferred that agents must initially have used di¤erent technologies and that next the center tossed a coin. The deduced di¤erence in initial technology hurts an agent's reputation. If instead an agent must continue his initial technology this may also mean that both agents initially used the same technology. The latter makes it more likely that the agents received a correct signal. As a result, continuation boosts an agent's reputation, and the reputational gap continues to exist even for a 1 = 0.
Welfare Comparisons
What are the consequences of the assignment of decision rights? Does it depend on the information on which reputations are based? We consider for each process the expected value of the technology that is in use at site 1 in period 2, assuming that 1 starts with Y , E X 1;2 js Y ; ; . The expectation is taken over y, and before 1 knows agent 2's technology in period 1, assuming of course equilibrium behaviour. The theoretical maximum value is E [Y jy > z], which obtains if agent 1 chooses the better technology in period 2 with probability one. No process generates this value, unless = 1 in which case the better technology is identi…ed in t = 1. Absent perverse behaviour, the theoretical minimum value
. This is the expected value in case the technology adopted at site 1 in t = 2 equals the …rst period choice with probability one, independent of the experience gained with the technologies in t = 1 throughout the economy.
To focus on di¤erences in value creation thanks to learning from own past behaviour and from the experience of others, we transform E X 1;2 js Y ; ; using the following formula,
That is, W ( ; ) 2 [0%; 100%] captures value creation thanks to learning, over and above 35 For the derivation, see the proof of Proposition 4.
the minimum value, as a percentage of what is maximally attainable. We refer to it as 'welfare.'
Decentralized learning: welfare comparisons
In this subsection, we compare with each other isolated agents, decentralized learning with locally determined reputations, and decentralized learning with globally determined reputations. Key to welfare comparisons are (i) the information agents have, and (ii) the degree to which they use it in the various situations. Consider (i). By de…nition, an isolated agent only knows the value of his own technology, and does not know what technology has been adopted at the other site. We know from Propositions 2 and 3 that in case of decentralized learning and globally determined reputations for any > 0 agent 1 also knows X 2;1 (but not x 2;1 if X 2;1 = Z), and that if reputations are locally determined he knows both X 2;1 and x 2;1 . If an agent does not care about his reputation, additional information can only lead to an increase in welfare. This implies that there is some 1 > 0 such that for all 2 (0; 1 ) additional information is also welfare-enhancing: Recall that ia stands for isolated agents, dl (cl) for decentralized (centralized ) learning, and gl (lo) for globally (locally) determined reputations. 37 Note that the 1 in lo dl = 1= is the upperbound of the support of f X . The inequality therefore holds independent of the chosen support.
38 By continuity, 2 < gl dl .
locally determined reputations leads to the highest project value, next comes decentralized learning with globally determined reputations, and isolated agents perform the worst.
To understand the condition E [Z] (1 + ) < 1, it is important to realize that information has two roles. On the one hand, additional information helps the agent in identifying the better technology. In case of locally determined reputations, agent 1 knows the value of the other technology. The di¤erence z y can be as large as 1 of a technology is su¢ ciently low. In case of the uniform distribution or any other symmetric distribution it holds.
In Figure 5 , we compare value, as measured by W , for decentralized learning with reputations that are locally and globally determined and for isolated agents under the assumption that the value of technology X 2 fY; Zg is uniformly distributed, f X (x) = 1 on [0; 1], and that = 
holds for all and .
Centralized learning: welfare comparisons
In this subsection, we compare with each other isolated agents, centralized learning with locally determined reputations, and centralized learning with globally determined reputa- . Proposition 6 is illustrated in Figure 6 for the uniform distribution and = 1=2. We have imposed that communication with the center is limited to at most two ranks in case agents initially used di¤erent technologies. Clearly, if agents can learn from others welfare improves.
Because of our limitation to at most two ranks, the graph understates the bene…ts for low values of . In fact, for = 0, agents would truthfully reveal their private information and the performance of a centralized learning process would equal that of a decentralized learning process. We then know from Figure 5 in case of globally determined reputations, whereas it dies out for high values of in case of locally determined reputations.
Further comparisons
In the previous two subsections we have analysed how welfare changes if, for a given assignment of decision rights, the information on which the perceptions of agents' abilities are based changes from local to global. In this subsection we turn to the complementary question, and analyse, for a given information base on which reputations can be based, the conditions that determine whether a decentralized process or a centralized process performs best.
If reputations are locally determined, the learning process that is best depends fundamentally on the parameters of the model.
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Proposition 7 Suppose
Then, in case of locally determined reputations, there exists a 6 < lo cl such that welfare W ( ; ) is higher with decentralized than with centralized learning for all > 6 .
If condition (16) is met, there are values of such that under a decentralized process the technology adoption decision in t = 2 depends on the observed values y and z, whereas in a centralized process, agents do not transmit useful information about their technologies. As a result, expected welfare is higher in case of decentralized learning. What learning process is best if reputations can also be based on comparisons across sites?
Proposition 9 In case of globally determined reputations, and for any f X , , and , welfare W ( ; ) is higher with centralized than with decentralized learning.
The main bene…t of moving from a decentralized process to a centralized one in case reputations can also be based on comparisons across sites is the restoration of communication when agents initially used di¤erent technologies. The proof establishes that even if agents in a centralized learning process were to limit themselves to a communication strategy consisting of at most two ranks -and choose a 1 optimally -welfare goes up. This suggests that the welfare di¤erence can be substantial for low values of , as such values allow for richer communication (i.e., …ner partitions).
Concluding Remarks
An important objective of this paper was to gain insight into the e¤ects of alternative learning processes on the quality of decisions in situations where information is dispersed among agents, and agents are concerned about their reputations. Our analysis focuses on two broad features of decision-making processes: the extent of a centralized process and whether reputations of decision-makers are based on local information only, or can also be based on comparisons across sites. We believe that our focus enabled us to derive a couple of interesting results. By focusing on these two broad features, we have abstracted from other features of learning processes. Here we would like to elaborate on some of the speci…c assumptions we have made.
Centralization. One important assumption is that in a centralized process the center always acts in the general interest. Milgrom and Roberts (1986) . How does the presence of veri…able information change our …ndings?
Although the nature of information manipulation changes, the incentives to manipulate continue to be determined by the interplay of the decision rights and the information on which reputations are based. As a result, the quality of information exchange depends in essentially the same way on these same two factors. Consider decentralized decision-making with locally determined reputations. The fact that an agent's reputation is independent of what the other agent does and that an agent can decide himself what technology he uses next makes that revealing all positive and negative pieces of information is a weakly dominant strategy. If reputations reputations are also based on comparisons across sites (and decentralised learning), it is important from a reputational perspective to convince the other agent to switch to "your" technology. As a result, any negative information will be withheld. The introduction of centralised decision-making in such a situation gives rise to the selective revelation of negative information. On the one hand, as the agent at a site loses decision-making power, he wants to make sure that the center is well-informed. On the other hand, his reputational concerns imply that he wants the center to impose "his" technology at either site. Ceteris paribus, the more damaging negative information is for the technological value, the more likely it is that the information is revealed. Similarly, the more damaging negative information is for his reputation, the less likely it becomes that this information is revealed.
In our model, signals are for free. However, one can easily imagine situations where agents can increase the probability of receiving an informative signal by putting more e¤ort in investigating technologies. We consider modeling agents'e¤ort decisions as a promising extension of our model. We expect that reputational concerns do not only lead to distortions in communication and decisions, but that they may also induce agents to put more e¤ort in investigating technologies, see e.g. Suurmond et al. (2004) .
Decision rights. We have limited attention to a centralized process and a decentralized process. A possible third organizational structure is a committee consisting of the two agents that makes a collective decision in period 2 on the basis of some voting rule. Visser and Swank (2007) Proof of Proposition 1:
and Pr (Y Y j ) = Pr (y tj ) =2 = (1 F ( t)) =2, and apply Bayes rule (analogously for^ (Y Z; t). Clearly, for given reputations the equilibrium strategy is a single threshold strategy with y ia satisfying (3). Given this strategy, equilibrium reputations are as in (2) 
, and so L is a complete lattice. It follows from Lemma 1 that (3) can be written as = f 1 ( ^ ; ). It follows from (3) that the function f 1 satis…es @f 1 =@ ^ ; @f 1 =@ > 0, and from (2) that ^ = f 2 ( ) is an increasing function of .
Hence, we can apply Theorem 3 in Milgrom and Roberts (1994) . The set of …xed points of f : L R + ! L is non-empty and equals the set of equilibria, and = y
F B ia
y ia is increasing in . Moreover, in case this set is not a singleton, both the highest and the lowest …xed point are increasing in . It is straightforward to check that for ia , y ia = 0. Proof of Proposition 2: The equilibrium belief functions follow immediately from the equilibrium message strategies. That the decision strategy is a double-threshold strategy follows from the analysis preceding the statement of the proposition. Finally, note that for t S = 0, the RHS of (4) Equating (17) and (18) shows that agent 1 is indi¤erent between sending m r+1 and m r for y = a r if (9) holds.
If X 1;1 = X 2;1 = Y , it is straightforward to check that, if agent 2 uses the collusion strategy, if the center's decision strategy is as stated, and for given beliefs^ , then for agent 1 a collusion strategy with y lo S satisfying (10) is a best-reply. It is straightforward to establish that the belief function follows from applying Bayes'rule to the communication strategies of the agents, and that the center's decision strategy is a best reply given the belief function. . The RHS of both (9) and (10) ia . In case of cl, two agents reveal information truthfully to the center. By continuity of W ia ( ; ) and W cl ( ; ) in , W ia ( ; ) < W cl ( ; ) for all < 4 , for some 4 > 0. The second part of the proposition follows from the facts that (i) Proof of Proposition 8: Consider cl, and suppose N = 3. We know E [Zj0 = a 0 z a 2 ] a 1 = E [Zja 1 z a 3 = 1] a 2 from (9). If two becomes the maximum number of ranks, then a 1 = 0, and so this equality becomes E [Zj0 z a 2 ] = E [Z] a 2 . For any f X , let a 2 < E [Z] denote the unique value of a 2 satisfying this equality. Let a 2=3 := (0; 0; a 2 ; 1).
Hence, (9) and (10) Proof of Proposition 9: Fix , ; and f X . Suppose X 1;1 = X 2;1 . A straightforward comparison of (6) and (12) shows that welfare is the same under dl and cl for all f X , , and
. Now suppose X 1;1 6 = X 2;1 . In case of cl and in equilibrium, the more ranks the agents use, the higher is W . Hence, it su¢ ces to show that the proposition is true if communication under cl is limited to two ranks. Proposition 4 (iv) shows that an equilibrium with two ranks exists for all parameter values. This partition is characterized by a 1 2 (0; E [Z]). Thus, if agents rank their technologies di¤erently, the center picks the higher ranked technology.
Given the communication strategies of the agents this technology is indeed the better one. (7)), whereas a 1 satis…es 1+ 4F (a 1 ) (1 F (a 1 )) = E [Z] a 1 (see (14)). As 4F (a 1 ) (1 F (a 1 )) < 1 for all a 1 , for given parameter values, the reputational gap in case of cl is smaller than in case of dl. As this gap equals the size of the distortion,
